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-1.  INTRODUCTION
In  light  of  recent  financlal  lnnovatlons  and  other  lnstabilltles  that
dlsrupt  the  llnk  between  the  nonetary  aS,gregates  and  economic  actlvity'  a
renewed  interest  in  the  role  of  the  monetary  base  in  the  fornulatlon  of  nonetary
poli.cy  has  emerged.  For  example,  both  l'teltzer  (1984,  1987)  and McCallun  (1987,
1988)  have  suggested  ruLes  for  monetary  base  behavlor  as  a  preferable  wehicle
for  lmplementlng  monetary  policy  to  that  of  Present  dlscretl'onsry  Pollcy
procedures  currently  in  place.  Mecallurn  goes  further,  provlding  evidence  to
suppott  the  notion  that  his  rule  'would,  tf  it  had  been  ln  effect,  have  kePt
nominal  GNP  for  the  United  States  close  to  a  smooth target  gronth  Path  over  the
perlod  1954-1.985 despite  the  regulatory  and  flnancial  turmoll  that  occurred
durlng  the  latter  part  of  that  perlod"(p.  173)'  Essentially,  McCallum's
evldence  shows  that  the  use  of  his  monetary  base  rule  would  have  precluded  the
emergence of  the  ever-increaslng  rates  of  lnflatlon  that  characterlze  the  1960s
and 1970s,
The  purpose  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  lte  ewaluate  nonlnal  GNP
behavi.or  under  three  altefnatLve  monetary  base  rules.  One version  ls  provided
by  Meltzer  (l-984,  1987),  another  by  McCallun  (1987,  1988),  and  a  thlrd  is  the
siuple  X-percent  growth  rule  consistent  with  the  ldork  of  Frlednan  (1959).  Our
evaluatlon  of  these  rules  ls  based  on  statistically  conparing  the  dlfference
between  sinulated  and  targeted  nominal  GNP.  We also  note  that,  in  hls  work,
Mccallun  comblnes  both  the  estimation  perlod  and  the  slmulation  Perlod  in
analyzlng  the  capabl1ltles  of  hls  base  rule.  Such an  approach  casts  susPicion
on  the  claim  that  the  policy  rule  would  work  well  in  a  true,  forward-looklng
policy  setting.  Ile  therefore  sepafate  the  estinatlon  period  fron  the  slmulatlon
sauPre .
Our  cornparison  of  the  rules'  ablllties  is  based  on  levels  and  growth  fate
targets  for  GNP.  l.lcCallurn's  evaluatLon  focuses  on  suruIlary  statlstics  (e.g-'root-mean- aquared  error)  that  conpare  the  lewel  of  slmulated  nonlnal  CNP to  the
targeted  level  of  GNP,  The  use  of  levels  and  not  growth  rates  is  curlous.
Notwtthstandlng  the  fact  that  !{ccallun's  estixsated  relatlonships  are  staced  in
growth-rate  terns,  nost  policy  obj ectives  are  stated  ln  grottth  rate  terms.  To
evaluate  the  robustness  of  the  rules,  we conpare  theirc  ablltty  to  hlt  GNP  growth
rate  obj ectives  as  well,
Second,  an ostensibly  uore  iuportant  Lssue  taken  up  ln  our  analysls  ls  the
role  that  currency  plays  in  lnplenenting  a  monetary  base  rule.  DenJ  anln
Frledrnan  (1988)  has  pointed  out  that  currency  currencly  comprlses  about  75
percent  of  the  monetary  base,  and  that  the  Federal  Reserve  elastlcally  suPplies
all  currency  dex0anded.  Based  on  these  two  observatlons,  he  argues  that  lt  ls  g
pglgg!  suspect  to  place  much credence  on  slmulated  results  ftom  a uonetary  base
rule,  We choose,  however,  not  to  reject  nonetary  base  rules  a  prlori  but  ask
the  following  question:  Given  a  reasonably  well-speclfled  currency  deuand
relationship  and  the  sinulated  values  for  GNP generated  from  a  base  rule,  what
would  be  the  levels  of  currency  demanded  by  the  publlc?  Along  ltlEh  the
dlfferent  rules'  slmulated  values  for  the  nonetary  base  and  the  slnulat€d  level
of  currency  held  by  the  public,  we  are  able  to  infer  the  behavLor  of  bank
reserves  under  each  rule.  Ultinately,  questions  of  lnterest  are:  I,lhat  wlII
happen  to  the  provislon  of  reserves  to  the  banking  systen  under  the  dlfferent
monelary  base  tules  studied  here?  Would this  provlsLon  be  consl-stent  with  other
conditions  in  the  econonoy? How might  it  affect  lnterest  rate  behavior?
Ihe  fornat  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.  The  following  section  Presents  a
brlef  description  of  the  Meltzer  and  Mccalluu  base  rules.  In  additlon,  we
present  the  underlying  estimates  used  to  deriwe  the  GNP  sinulatlon  results  and a
conparison  of  the  rules'  relative  ablllty  to  mlnloize  devlatlons  around  the
level  and  gro!.th  rate  targets  of  nonlnal  GNP.  Uslng  an  estlmatlon  period  of1955 through  1969  to  parauetetlze  the  nodels,  our  slmulation  results  are  based
on  a  sanple  perlod  of  1970  to  1989.  T'he questlon  about  the  dlstribution  of
currency  and  total  reserves  obtained  by  lnplenentlng  the  base  rules  ls  addressed
in  Sectlon  3.  Concludlng  remarks  close  the  paper  ln  Sectlon  4.
SECTION 2:  BASE RULES  AND SIMUIATED NOMINAL  GNP  BEHAVIoR
All  base  rules  considered  here  are  based  on  knosn  lnformatlon,  lltplylng
that  polley  actlons  ate  dlctated  by  past  events  and  not  upon  the  forecasts  of
future  economlc  acti.vlty.  We thus  see  these  rules  in  sharp  contrast  to  today's
dlscretionary  pollces  which  are  based  on  forecasts  of  future  econonlc
perforrnance  . 1
2.1 Meltzer's  Rule
l(elxzex  (1984,  1987)  suggests  a  base  rule  that  recognlzes  the  need  for
changes  in  base  growth  as  the  econonlc  environment  changes.  Thls  aspect  ls
especially  notable  in  the  ewent of  financlal  innovatlons  that  oay  alter  the  time
path  of  velocity,  As Meltzer  points  out,  his  rule  ls  not  one  to  adjust  qulckly
to  transient  moveuents  ln  the  relationshlp  between  outPut  and  base  groltth,  but
one  that  conslders  only  the  changes  ln  the  longer  tern  drift  ln  base  veloclty.
Moreover,  the  rule  would  arguably  allow  monetary  policynakers  to  achleve  Price
level  stability  on average.
Meltzer's  rule  can  fornallv  be  stated  as




where  B  !s  the  1og of  the  uonetary  base,  y  ls  the  1og  of  real  outPut,  and VB is
base  veloclty,  deflned  as  the  log  of  the  ratlo  of  nomlnal  GNP  to  base'  TtIe A  ls
the  first  -  difference  operator,  such  that  AXr  -  Xt  -Xt-l.  In  thls  fornulatlon,
we adopt  Meltzer's  sug8estion  of  a  three-year  noving  avefage,  even  though  thts
choice  is  not  b6sed  on  any  formal  analysis.  As  he  notes,  "Ttre  three-year
L? L2novlng-  average  gives  time  to  learn  whether  shocks  are  pernanent  or  transitory.
It  provldes  for  faster  uoney  growth  relative  to  output  in  a  cyclical  recesslon
and  slower  money growth  relative  to  output  tn  a  cycllcal  expansion.  " (1987  ,  p.
12,  Because  money  per  unit  of  output  deternlnes  the  ptlce  level  ln  the  long
run,  the  rule  thus  gives  price  stability  across  the  business  cycle,  In  the
empirical  work  below,  equation  (l)  ls  referred  to  as  the  "HeLtzer  Rule."2
2.2  McCallurn's Rule
I'tcCallun  (1987,  1988)  stresses  that  a  successful  monetary  base  rule  is  one
that  establlshes  a  target  path  for  nomtnal  cNP that  equals  the  econony's  1on8-
run  average  rate  of  growth  for  real  output.3  A  rule  that  on  average  alloss  GNP
to  grow  only  at  the  saue  rate  as  real  output  rllll  result  in  inflation  being
equal  to  zero  on average.  McCallum's  rule,  like  Meltzer's,  eschews the  flxed,  X-
percent  growth  rate  approach  on  the  grounds  that  the  economic  envlronment
changes  ln  ways  that  would  cause  flxed  rules  to  have  slgnlficantly  dlfferent
effects  fron  those  anticipated.  Unllke  Meltzer's  rule,  howewer,  ltcCallun  allows
the  pollclmaker  to  respond  to  short-tern  departures  ln  observed  nonlnal  GNP  frorn
l-ts  target  level.  He thus  cornbines Meltzer's  choice  for  allowlng  base  groltth  to
vary  with  cycllcal  changes  ln  velocity  wlth  feedback  frorn  the  rule's  error  ln
hitting  the  target  warlable  to  deternine  the  behavior  of  base  growth.  Hence,
McCallun's  rule  allows  the  policy  naker  to  reaet,  albeLt  in  a  very  speciflc
uanner,  to  changes  ln  the  trend  of  base  velocity  and  to  deviations  ln  the  level
of  GNP  from  its  deslred  Dath.
Mccallun's  rule  can  formally  be  stated  as:
(2)  AB. -  q.9q7tt  -  (l/L6, IYt_1-Yr-17-Br_l+Bt_17]  + l(Y*.-1-Yg_1)
where  AB is  grorth  rate  of  the  monetary  base,  Y  is  the  log  of  nonlnal  GNP, Y*  is
the  target  path  value  for  GNP,  and  )  (0  <  I  <  1)  repxesents  the  feedback
coefficient,  T'he  constant  tern  ln  equation  (2)  (0,00739)  is  sinply  thequarterly  value  for  a  desired  3  percent  annual  growth  rate  of  nonlnal  GNP.  The
second  term  on  the  right-hand-side  of  equatlon  (2)  accounts  for  changes  tn  the
behavior  of  base  velocity  during  the  past  four  years,  teflectlng  changes  ln  the
publlc's  denand  for  base  rnoney.  Given  the  negatlve  slgn,  a  ceteris  parlbus
lncrease  (decrease)  ln  the  trend  of  base  velocity  results  in  a  requlred
xeduction  (expanslon)  of  base  growth,  slullat  to  the  l{eltzer  Rule.  The  f!na1
term  reflects  the  feedback  aspect  of  the  rule:  It  speclfies  that  the  growth  of
the  base  w111  be  altered  by  sorne .\-percentage  polnts  per  year  for  each  one
percentage  point  devlation  ln  GNP  from  lts  path  ln  the  ptevious  quarter.  In  the
enplrlcal  lrork  that  follows,  equation  (2)  ls  referred  to  as  the  "Mccallum  Rule."
2.3  The SimulaEion  Ptocedure
Following  McCallun  we first  evaluate  the  abillty  of  the  rules  to  achleve  a
target  level  of  norninal  GNP, which  is  assuned  to  grow  at  a  3  percent  annual
rate.  In  order  to  calculate  the  perfornance  of  the  McCallur  Rule  ln  nlnlnlzlng
devlatlons  around  a  glven  target  path  for  incone,  lt  is  flrst  necessary  to
speclfy  a  link  between  base  growth  and  lncome  grordth.  Although  McGallun  (1988)
provides  evidence  based  on  a  variety  of  nodels,  thefe  appears  to  be  little  gain
ln  rnovlng  away fron  a  relatively  sinple  "reduced- forn"  type  of  oodel.  In  thls
paper,  we choose  the  following  rrersion:4
(3)  AYa -  og + ol  AYr_l  + a2 ABr-1 +  €lt
whete  AY  is  the  growth  rate  of  nominal  GNP,  AB  is  defined  above,  and  ea
represents  random  shocks  to  the  growth  of  GNP.  Although  one  could  estimate
equatlon  (3)  with  contenporaneous  base  growth  on  the  right  hand  side,  we  use
thts  version  to  capture  the  fact  that  the  monetary  authorlty  nust  declde  thelr
actions  before  current  economic  condttlons  are  reallzed.  To  compate  almulated
GNP with  target  levels  in  the  franework  of  the  McCallun  Rule,  the  parameter
5estlmates  from  equation  (3)  are  taken  as  glven.  Uslng  the  rule  given  by
equetlon  (2)  and  some lnlti.al  values  of  GNP  growth  and base  grolrth,  a  sinul-ated
value  for  base  growth  is  determined.  With  siDulated  base  growth  one  can  then
use  equatlon  (3)  to  get  a  new value  for  noninal  GNP, whlch  ls  then  fed  through
equation  (2)  and  so  on,
Because l{eltzer's  Rule  is  specified  in  terns  of  real  output,  we  use  the
followlng  nodificatlon  to  the  proceduxe  descrlbed  above.  We flrst  speclfy  a
Ilnking  equatlon  of  the  forrn
(4)  APr -  'r0 + 11 A P.-1 + .r2  A Br_1 + €2r
where  AP  ls  the  growth  rate  of  the  price  level.  To  generate  sluulatlons  of
noninal  GNP cornparable  the  I'lcCallun  Rule,  we  use  equation  (4)  to  ltnk  simulated
base  growth  to  changes  ln  the  prlce  level.  To  simulate  real  GNP lrithln  the
framework  of  the  Meltzer  Rule,  the  following  procedure  is  used.  Uslng  a  lnltlal
value  for  base  and  nominal  GNP,  equati.on  (3)  ls  used  to  generate  slmulated
nominal  GNP. Slnilarly,  a  walue  of  lnflatlon  ls  generated  using  equation  (4),
the  lnltlalization  values  for  base  grorrth  and  past  inflatlon.  Subtractlng
sirnulated  inflation  fron  slrnulated  GNP yields  siuulated  real  output  growth,
which  ls  used  to  construct  the  three-year  noving  average  in  equation  (L).  Also,
the  three-year  rnowing average  of  base  veloclty  is  calculated  uslng  the  simulated
nominal  GNP frou  equation  (3)  cornblned wlth  slmulated  values  of  base  grolrth.
Ftorn bere  the  process  is  the  same as  above.
2.4  Data  and  Slrnulation  Results
The data  for  this  study  consi.sts  of  quarterly,  seasonally  adjusted  data  on
nomlnal  CNP, the  GNP  deflator  (1982-100)  and  the  uonetafy  base.  Based upon  the
work  of,  among others,  Haslag  and Hein  (l-990),  \{e  use  the  St.  Louis  deflnltlon
of  the  monetary  base  adjusted  for  reserve  requLrenent  changes.  The  data  span
the  perlod  1955.1-  through  1989.4.
6Before  turnlng  to  the  actual  sinulatlon  results,  we  should  relterate  that
our  approach  to  exanining  the  usefulness  of  these  monetary  base  rules  dlffers
fron  that  used  by  !{cCallun  (1.988).  I{hereas  McCall-un  estl-mates  equatlon  (3)
across  the  enttre  sauple  awallable  (1954-85)  and  "slmulates'  base  and  GNP for
the  same sample,  we  estluate  the  underlylng  equatlons  through  a  glven  Polnt  and
then  simulate  out  of  the  estimatlon  period.
To  inplenent  the  l{ccallun  and l{eltzer  Rules,  estlnates  of  equatlon  (3)  are
needed.  The  equatlon  is  estinated  over  the  perlod  1955.1  through  !969.4  Ln
order  to  provide  the  coefficient  estlnates  used  ln  the  sinulatlon  exerclse.
Ttlese estimates  are  (standard  errors  in  parentheses):
(5)  Ayc -  0.0090 +  0.262 ayr-l  +  0.390 ABr_1
(0.002)  (0.120) (0.  198  )
n2  - o.r+  s.E. - o.oo9  B-G  - 1.25
The  estirnation  results  indicate  that  both  lagged  GNP growth  and  the  gtowth
of  the  base  significantly  affect  current  cNP grorrth.  A Breusch-Godfrey  test  for
serial  correlatlon  Ln  the  errors  was conducted:  T'lxe  calculated  F-statistic  (B-
G)  of  1.25  indicates  that  we  cannot  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  no  serlal
correlation  in  the  reslduals.  We also  should  note  that  our  estlnates  are  very
sinilar  to  those  obtained  by  Mccallun  for  his  l-954  -  1985  sanple  perlod.5
Meltzer's  RuIe  is  irnplenented  first  by  obtaining  an estimate  of  equation  (4)  for
the  1955.1-1969.4  sample  period.  These  estinates  are  (standard  errors  ln
parentheses ) ;
(6',) APr -  0.004 + 0.321 Apr-l  + 0.1s7 ABt-l
(0.001)  (0.121)  (0.084)
il2: o.rs sEE  :  0.004  Bc  -  1.45
The  results  are  surprisingly  simllar  to  those  using  noulnal  GNP gro\sth.  The
results  for  the  inflation  equatlon  show that  Iagged  lnflation  and  l-agged base
Browth  together  explain  15 percent  of  the  variation  in  inflacion.  One aspect  ofthls  equatlon  is  the  relatively  low  estlmate  of  the  lagged  base  coefflcient,
lndlcatlng  that  our  adnlttedly  slnple  nodel  does  not  fu1ly  capture  the  dynanic
relation  between  lnflatlon  and  changes  ln  base  growth.  Even  so,  these  sinple
models  are  used  to  make our  slnulatlon  exercise  conforrn  as  elosely  as  possible
wlth  l{cCallun's  work,  sLnce  hts  is  the  best  known  empirlcal  lnvestl8atlon
addressing  similar  issues  along  the  lines  taken  here.6
2.5  Euplrlcal  Ewldence:  Lewels
Using  on  the  base  rules  gi.ven  by  equations  (1)  and  (2)  and  the  estiu'ated
parameters  values  !n  equations  (5)  and  (5),  sinulated  values  for  the  log  level
of  GNP  were  generated  for  the  sample  perlod  1970.1  through  1989.4.  Followlng
Mccalh:n,  the  target  level  of  nomlnal  GNP Ls  asstrmed  to  increase  at  an  annual
rate  of  3  percent.T  Figure  1  plots  the  slnulated  and  target  values  fot  1og
lewel  of  nonlnal  GNP across  the  1970-89  period,  Included  are  the  results  for
the  sinple  X-percent  RuIe,  where  base  growth  ls  set  equal  to  3  Percent,  the
Meltzer  Rule  and  the  Mcca}lrrrn Rule.  The  latter  PIot  is  based  on  a  )  value  set
equal  to  0.25.  In  terms  of  comparing  leve1s  of  GNP to  the  talget  ?ath,
McCallun's  Rule  appears  superior.  Thls  observatlon  comes  from  the  fact  that
slnulated  values  tend  to  revert  back  to  the  target  Path:  Indeed,  given  the
presence  of  the  feedback  paraneter  in  the  McCallun  Rule,  one would  be  surprised
to  flnd  otherwLse.
To  better  eompare the  outcome  of  our  dlfferent  simulations,  we  calculated
the  root  mean square  error  (RMSE)  and mean error  (ME) of  the  slnulat€d  log  level
of  GNP  for  the  Meltzer  Rule,  the  McCall.uu Rule  using  seweral  values  of  l,  and
the  two  X-percent  base  growth  ruLes  (31  and  0  Z)  relatlve  to  the  targeted  1og
level  of  noninal  GNP.  The  results  are  presenled  tn  Table  1.  Ranklng  the
different  rules  by  their  relative  Rl{SEs,  our  findlngs  generally  concur  wlth
Mc0allurn's:  T'lxe lowes!  RMSE  of  0.0215  ls  found  by  setting  I  -  0.50  ln  out
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comparisons  ln  Table  I  further  reveal  that  a  rule  that  Derely  alIows
growth  to  change wlth  long-tern  swings  in  base  velocity  (the  MelEzer
preferable  to  one  that  fixes  base  growth  at  sone  Predeternined  level,
of  achlevlng  a GNP  levels  target.  For  example,  flxlng  base  groltth  at  3
percent,  the  targeted  GNP  growth  rate  that  reduces  Lnflatlon  to  zero  on avefage '
yields  a  RMSE that  is  nore  than  four  tlmes  larger  than  any  found  uslng  che
McCalltrm  Rule,  and  over  three  times  larger  than  that  found  uslng  the  l'leLtzer
Ru1e.  Note  also  that  even  a  zeto  percent  base  growth  scenarlo  results  ln  the
lewel  of  norninal  GNP exceedlng  desired,  as  lndicated  by  the  large  mean error
(ME).  ltris  occurs  because base  velocity  ls  sLnulated  xo  Erow at  a  rate  greater
than  3 percent  per  annum.  Overall,  the  results  in  Table  1  support  the  view  that
to  uinlnlze  dewiations  in  the  IggC!  of  nominal  GNP fron  a  target  path  of  three-
percent  growth,  the  feedback  tule  advocated  by  Mccallurn  is  superlor  to  one  that
allows  only  for  velocity  swings  or  sets  base  growth  equal  to  sone  Predeternined
race .
2.5  Ernpirical  Ewidence:  Growth Rates
The  evidence  ln  Table  L  supports  McCallun's  contention  that  the  rule
erobodied in  equation  (2)  is  preferable  glven  some predeternined  target  level  of
noninal  GNP.  The use  of  a  levels  cri.terion  seems odd,  however,  ln  llght  of  the
fact  that  the  motivation  for  the  UcCallun  Rule  relies  on  the  notion  that  long-
run  nonlnal  GNP growth  of  3  percent  equals  the  hlstorical  long-run  growth  of
real  outpuE,  hence  setLing  average  inflatlon  ao 
".to.8 
Why  ts  it  that  thls
long-term  growth  relatlonship  motlvates  the  ru1e,  but  does  not  form  the
objectlve  by  which  the  rule  ts  Judged?  What  ts  lt  that  suggests  that  nonlnal
CNP is  trend  stationary  so  that  thete  are  no  pentranent  shocks  to  the  level  ofGNP?9  Moreower,  there  Ls  the  casual  observation  that  monetary  po1lcy
discussions  are  usually  couched  in  terns  of  tatget  growlh  rates  for  GNP.
Another  reason  for  conslderlng  a  growth  rate  comparison  stems  fron  the  fact
that  the  usefulness  of  the  statistlcal  neasures  of  varlance,  such  as  the  RMSEs
in  Table  l-,  nay be  questi.oned  when the  underlying  series  are  not  statlonary.  In
other  words,  different  series,  sone of  which  are  and are  not  statLonary,  are  not
cornparable  using  standard  measureg  of  dlsperslon.  Those  serlea  that  afe  non-
stationary  w111  result  ln  disperslon  measures  that  are  functlons  of  tfure.  To
assess  the  walldlty  of  thls  statlstlcal  concern,  we  used  the  procedures  of
Dickey  and  Fuller  (1979)  to  test  whether  the  deviations  of  sluulated  l-evels  of
GNP  fron  the  target  path  for  each  of  the  base  rules  ln  Table  1  are  statlonary.
The  results  of  our  unlt  root  tests,  reported  tn  Table  2,  substantlates  the
concern  that  a  statlstlcal  comparlson  of  the  RMSES  frou  the  levels  results  are
not  comparable  across  different  rules.  Note  how the  deviatlons  for  the  McCallun
RuIe  ln  hrhich  .l  equals  0.50  ls  the  only  series  for  whlch  the  hypothesis  of
statlonarlty  cannot  be  rejected  at  the  5  percent  level  of  signiflcance.lo  In
every  other  case,  the  devlatLons  of  sinulated  GNP  fron  path  are  not  statlonary.
Thus,  conparlng  che RMSEs  in  Table  1  is  ulsleading.
Based on  the  foregoing  discussi.on,  we have  calculated  the  respectlve  R!{SE's
based  on  dewiations  of  sinulated  GNP  grotr'th  rates  from  the  target  groltth  rate  of
3  percent  per  year.  As  shonn  in  the  second  column  of  Table  2,  devlatlons  of
slmulated  GNP  growth  rates  from  the  target  growth  rate  generally  afe  stationary.
The results  for  a  growth  rate  criterion,  reported  ln  Table  3,  do not  corroborate
the  conclusions  drawn  from  the  evldence  ln  Tab1e 1.  Based on  the  RMSEs  reported
in  Table  3,  a McCallun  Rule  that  sets  I  equal  to  zero  generates  a  slnulated  GNP
grolrth  path  that  mlnlnizes  the  devlati.on  from  the  3  percent  target  rate  relatlve
to  any  other  rule  tested.  This  indicates  that  the  feedback  nechanlsn  ln  the
McCallun  Rule  is  superfluous  in  a  gro\rth  rate  settlng.ll  More  interesclng  ls
L0the  findlng  that  there  !s  very  litt1e  difference  among the  rePorted  RMSEg  under
a  growth-rate  crlterlon.  For  instance,  settlng  base  growth  equal  to  zero
deliwers  a  RMSE  that  ts  lower  than  the  outcone  uslng  McCallun's  Rule  rtlth  I  set
equal  to  0.50,  the  MSE-ulninizlng  value  in  Table  1.  I'loreover,  the  RMSE  values
using  McCallum's  Rule  with  l  equal  to  0,50  or  Meltzer's  Rule  are  essentlally  the
same:  The  largest  devlation  in  Rt{SEs is  only  about  20  basis  points.  The
evidence  fron  the  mean  errors  (f{E)  also  lndicates  that  no  base  rule  generates
sinulated  values  that  tend  to  drift  far  fron  the  target  gtowth  rate.  A11 rules
result  in  noninal  GNP growth  that  are  on  everage  wlthln  one  percentage  polnt  of
the  target  growth.
fhe  evidence  based  on  a  cNP growth  rate  target  indlcates  that  the  supPort
of  a  feedback  rule  to  guide  base  growth  nust  be  tenpered.  Wlth  base  veloclty
growth  behavlng  as  a  slnple  autoregressive  process,  a  rule  that  sets  the  grordth
of  base  equal  to  the  target  GNP growth  and  adjusts  for  prevlous  movenenta  ln
base  velocity  growth  is  superior  to  a  rule  wlth  a  non-zero  l.  Such a  rule  ls
sfuntlar  to  that  advocated  by  Meltzer.  Horeover,  lt  should  also  be  noted  that
the  slrnple  X-percent  Rule,  with  base  growth  set  equal  xo  zexo,  also  delLvers
slnuleted  path  for  GNP  growth  that  yields  departures  fron  the  target  growth  of
Dercent  as  low  or  lower  than  a McCallun  Rule  with  a non-zero  I.
Given  the  notable  change  ln  relative  rankings  of  the  different  rules  when
one  switches  from  a  levels  target  to  a  growth  rate  target  for  GNP  '  an
lnterestlng  question  is  which  of  these  obj ectlves  is  pteferable?  The choice  of
a  level  or  grorrth  rate  criterion  to  coDpare  dlfferent  rules  hingea  on  the
poltcymaker's  subJ  ectiwe  preferences.  If  a  pollcymaker  wishes  to  ninlnlze
dewiations  fron  a  target  level  of  GNP, then  the  McCallurn RuIe  ls  preferred  over
the  I'leltzer  or  X-pereent  Rules.  Indeed,  the  presence  of  a  feedback  mechanisn
ln  this  rule  virtually  assures  that  deviations  ttill  asynPtotically  aPProach
a
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ttzeto.  On the  olher  hand,  some pollcymakers  nay  prefer  a  targec  gtowt'h  tate'
Casual  observatlon  of  Federal  Reserve  statenents  lndlcates  that  Pollcy  tarEets
usually  are  announced  ln  terns  of  groltth  rates.  Accordlngly,  our  analysls  would
suggest  that  the  RMSEs reported  in  Table  3  sre  nore  useful  for  compalcing  the
merlts  of  different  policy  rules.  In  short,  Tables  1  and  3  w111 be  interPreted
accordtng  to  ihe  pollcynaker's  (and  reader's)  preferences.  The upshot  of  these
results  are  that  dlfferent  targeting  procedures  wll'l  be  preferred  dependlng  on
whlch  obj ectlve  functlon  --  levels  or  grouth  rates  --  that  the  pollcyuaker
rrishes  to  satlsfy.
3.  THE ROLE OF CI'RRENCY
Previous  discussions  of  poltcy  rules,  such  as  those  Presented  above,  focus
on  the  outcome  of  sirnulated  GNP felatlve  to  sone  target  elther  ln  level  or
growth  rate  forn.  An  lmportant  question  that  has  been  lgnored  in  thls  line  of
research  ls  how  the  nonetary  authorlty  will  achieve  a  glven  base  Path  under
dlfferent  rules,  One  of  the  nost  corapelllng  reasons  given  for  selectlng  a
monetary  base  target  in  lieu  of  an  interest  rate  of  other  monetary  aggTegat-e
target  is  that  the  policymaker  exercises  more  dlrect  and  timely  control  over
movenents  ln  the  base.  A  comron  argument  to  the  eontrary  ls  that  the  uonetary
base  is  conprlsed  largely  of  currency  and  thus  ls  not  directly  controlled  by  the
red.l2  To puE  thls  point  into  perspective,  in  1955.1  currency  comprlsed  about
55  percent  of  the  base  while  by  l-989,4  this  flgure  had  risen  to  75  percent.
Consequently,  one  question  often  ralsed  concerns  the  variabllity  of  base  growth
that  stexos frorq  the  variabllity  of  currency  growth:  Is  it  posslble  to  actrieve  a
given  base  obj ective  given  fluctuations  tn  currency  dernand?13
The  concern  is  that  the  nonetary  authorlty  does  not  have  dlrect  contlol
over  the  base  since  it  elastlcally  supplies  whatever  currency
public.14  lllth  a  nonetary  base  target  changes  ln  currency
paribus  will  force  the  uonetary  authorlty  to  a1!er  the  suPPIy
ls  denanded  by  the
denanded  ceterls
of  reserves  to  the
12banking  systen  lf  the  authority  is  to  hit  the  deslred  base  target'  In  the
absence  of  GNP evldence  unifornly  supportlng  one  base  rule  over  another,  we
exanine  the  role  that  eurrency  plays  ln  each  ru1e.  If  one  lnpl'ements  any  of  the
base  rules  dLscussed  here,  the  loglcal  and  heretofore  unanswefed  questlon  ls
nHow must  the  monetary  authorlty  adjust  total  reserves  ln  the  face  of  autononous
changes  in  currency  demand?  "
To  address  that  questlon,  we  conduct  the  folloltlng  exPerinent.  The  supply
of  currency  is  assumed to  be perfectly  elasttc.  To  sinulate  a  leve1  of  currency
assoclated  wlth  siuulated  GNP,  the  followlng  currency  denand  equatlon  was
estlmated  for  the  sample period  1955-1959  (standard  errors  l-n ParenEheses):15
(7)  act -  -0.0001  + 0.783  ACt_l  - 0.150  acr_2  *  ,0..?!9  ac.-r -  (0.001) (0.137)  - -  (0.178)  (0'129)
+  0.10L  AYt-l - 0.0016  Att-l
(0.047) (0.00r-)
nZ *  O.SZ  S.E. :  0.003  B-G  -  0.20
This  relatiwely  sinple  dernand  speciflcation  indlcstes  that  currency  growth
(AC)  is  deternined  by  its  own  lagged  values  along  with  legged  values  of  GNP
growth  (AY)  and  interest  rates  (Al),  the  latter  rneasured as  the  flrst  diffetence
of  the  three-nonth  Treasury  bill  rate.  Although  the  interest  rate  tern  does not
achieve  statistlcal  signlflcance  at  standard  levels  (t-1.6),  lt  ts  retalned  ln
the  nodel  to  eonforrn with  others  found  ln  the  literature.
This  sinple  speclficatton  of  currency  demand ls  used  ln  conJunetlon  wlth  the
simulated  values  of  GNP growth  to  obtain  a  sinulated  1ewel  of  currency  lmplled
under  the  dlfferent  base  rules.  That  ts,  each  base  rules'  sl'nulated  GNP  series
ls  used  to  construct  a  s  irnulated  currency  selies  based  on  the  parameter
estimates  found  ln  equation  (7).  Lagged  values  of  slmulated  currency  are  fed
through  the  sinulatlon  period  as  the  equatl-on  uPdates.  In  thls  exPerlnent,
historical  values  of  the  interest  rate  are  used  ln  the  sirnulation.l5
13The slnulated  values  for  Eotal  reserves.  whlch  reflect  the  behavior  of  the
nonetary  authorlty  lnposed  by  the  use  of  the  base  rule,  are  found  by  subtractlng
the  level  of  sinulated  currency  from  simulated  base.  Table  4  rePorts  the
siuulated  levels  of  base,  cutrency  and  reserves  for  the  terninal  perlod.  The
table  dranatieally  shows  that  adhering  to  any  of  the  base  rules  analyzed  here
would  require  that  the  uonetary  authority  draln  totel  reserves  fron  the  banking
systen  at  an  Lncredulous  rate.  Plots  of  the  tlne  Paths  for  thes€  slnulated
neasures  (not  reported)  also  lndlcate  that  siEulated  curreney  generally  exceeds
sinulated  base  early  ln  the  sinulatlon  perlod.  The  result  using  the  X-Percent
Rule  setting  base  growth  equal  to  three  percent  shows  the  lontest  period  of
posltlve  total  reserves,  turning  negatlwe  in  1985.
How sensitive  are  these  results  to  the  forn  of  the  currency  equation?  A
simulation  based  on  a  currency  equetlon  that  relates  curfent  currency  grosth
only  to  contemporaneous  and  lagged  GNP growth  also  dellvers  the  qualitatlve
outcome reported  in  Table  4.  The fac!  that  total  reserves  turn  tregative  ls  not
a  consequence  of  the  speclftc  currency  denand  speclfication  used,  but  of  the
fact  that  because base veloclty  rises  with  slnulated  GNP, the  level  of  base  must
faIl,  This  neans  that  lf  currency  dernand (and  hence  supply)  ls  Positlvely
related  to  the  incoxne leve1  of  the  publlc,  total  reserves  as  a ProPortion  of  the
nonetary  base  uust  decline  over  time  as  long  as  a  non- Lnflation  pollcy  ls
pursued.  Indeed,  that  is  what  our  experlment  forcefully  demonstrates  across  a
variety  of  base rrr1r".17
Our  experinent  indicates  that  total  reserves  turn  negative  if  the
policynaker  follows  the  constralnts  of  any  base  rule  presented  here.  An  obvlous
response  to  this  experinent  is  that  key  featutes  of  the  economy  are  omltted  that
would  hawe  reduced  currency  denand  as  a  proportlon  of  the  uonetary  base  ao  that
total  reserves  falllng  below  zero  would  not  oecur.  For  exanple,  strlctly
following  any  of  the  base  rules  examined would  requite  contracting  reserves  but,
L4as  reserves  fell  below  sone  critical  level,  interest  rates  would  begin  to  rlse
in  order  to  attract  deposits.  Such an  adjustment,  not  ceptured  ln  out  uodel,
would  quel1  the  rise  ln  currency  demand  and  total  reserves  would  (nay)  renaln
posltlve.lS  Recognizing  thLs  concern,  ne  attempced  severaL  pernutatlons  of  the
estlnated  currency  nodel,  such  as  lncluding  laggeil  values  of  total  reserves  in
an  attempt  to  capture  the  pressure  on  deposltory  instltutions  to  keep  total
reserves  positive,  This,  too,  falled  to  keep  total  reserves  fron  golng
negatlve.
One interpreEatlon  of  these  slnulations  ls  to  recognize  that  the  base  rules
funply  resu)-ts  so  far  outside  our  hLstorlcal  experlence  that  sufflclent  changes
in  currency  denand  are  not  attalnable  based  on  actual  data.  As  such,  the  so-
called  Lucas  critique  should  be  invoked  when looklng  at  our  sinulatLon  results.
Indeed,  total  feserves  near  zero  would  represent  a  dramatic  regine  change by  the
pollcy  naker.  Such  changes  in  the  rules  of  conducting  monetary  pollcy  would
surely  be  evldenced  by  changes  ln  the  parameter  esflmates  used  to  sinulate
currency  demand and  hence  total  reserves.
an  hlstorlcal  experlment  to  dralr  on
estlmates  would  be  affected.
4.  CONCLUSIoNS
Unfortunately,  we  slnply  do  not  have
that  tells  how  much  these  paraneter
Recent  flnancial  lnnovations  and  their  attendant  impacts  on  monetary
control  procedures  have  sparked  renewed  interest  ln  nonetary  base  rules  to  guide
pol-icy.  Suggested  rules  have  gone beyond  Frledman's  slnple  X-percent  approach
of  Fciednan.  For  exanple,  Meltzer  argues  for  adjusting  base  growth  to  reflect
swlngs  in  base  velocity  ln  an  attempt  to  offset  the  effects  of  financlal
lnnovatlons.  l,lcCalluro  reconnends  appending  a  dynanlc  feedback  xoechanlsm onto  a
Mellzer-type  rule,  so  that  base  groa'th  adjusts  to  observed  departures  ln  GNP
fron  lts  target  objectlve,  Based  on  statistlcal  criterla  and  the  casual"
I5observation  that  GNP  policy  discusslons  by  the  Fedetal  Open Harket  Connlttee
couched  ln  terns  of  growth  rates,  we prefer  the  use  of  a  growth  rate  target
the  basls  of  conparlson  over  a  levels  target.  Conpartng  the  dlfferent  rules
perfornance  on  this  criterion,  we  find  very  llttle  dlfference  between  the  three
rules  evaluated  here.  This  ts  lnteresting  for  the  very  fact  that  '  on  the  basls
of  a  growth  rate  criterlon,  the  siuple  X-percent  rule  does  about  as  well  ln
mLnlmlzLng  devlations  of  GNP froro  the  target  as  ihe  more  soPhisticated  rules.
We also  ftnd  that  adoptlng  any of  the  base  rules  dlscussed  here  would  force
the  monetery  euthortty  to  restrlct  the  supply  of  reserves  to  the  banklng  system
to  such  an  extent  that  by  the  end  of  the  slmulation  perlod,  base  would  consiat
solely  of  currency.  Is  such  an  outcome  feasible?  No:  Adopttng  any  of  these
rules  represents  a  drsmatic  break  in  the  behavior  of  the  monetary  base  relatlve
to  that  observed  hlstorically.  consequently,  inposing  any  of  the  nonetary  base
rules  exanined  here  would  nark  such  a  drastlc  change  tn  pollcy  that  behavloral
parameter  estinates  would  change.  We thus  lnterpret  our  evldence  as  conflrming
the  enpirical  valldtty  and  relewance  of  the  Lucas  crltlque.
The message one  should  take  anay  ftom  our  results  ls  not  of  rnodel  failure,
even  though  sone  of  the  evidence  tends  to  support  the  concerns  raised  by
opponents  of  monetary  base  rules,  The  role  of  cutrency  requlres  greater
understandlng,  lndeed  must  be  accounted  for  ls  some rray,  that  the  nonetary  base
rules  evaluated  here  do not  acconpllsh.  Thus,  whlle  any  of  the  rules  evaluated
here  show  that  they  are  qulte  able  to  achiewe  desired  GNP 8roltth  rate
objectlves,  the  issue  left  fot  further  research  is  a more detalled  lnvestigatlon




1,  l.leltzer  (1987)  argues  that  forecast
ls  so  poor  that  policy  is  likely  to  be
generatlng  process  nay  be  an  ARMA. thus
in  constructing  these  rules.
accuracy  of  future  economlc  Pelfornance
destabillzlng.  Alternatively,  the  data-
supportln8  the  use  of  past  observations
2.  lteltzer  also  suggested  gains  to  be  reaLized  lf  the  rule  was  adopted  by  a
nunber  of  other  countries  at  the  saue  tlne,  resulting  ln  cootdinaled  long-run
polleies,  I.Ie do  not  consider  thls  potentlally  lEPortsnt  aspect  of  Meltzer's
suggested  fule.
3.  For  a  recent  exposltlon  of  noninal  CNP targetlng,  see  Bradley  and  Jansen
(1989).  Earller  dlscusslons  of  GNP targetlng  are  found  1n  Gordon  (1985)  and
Taylor  (1985).
4.  Haslag  and  Hein  (1989)  consider  nodlficatlons  to  equallon  (2),  such  as
longer  lags  or  the  inclusion  of  fiscal  policy  neasures.  fhese  efforts,  hosever,
do not  yleld  significant  lmptovement  on the  tcesults  teported  for  equation  (2)  in
its  current  forE.
5.  For  purposes
perlod  1954 -  1985
AY' :  6.6970 - 
(.002)
of  conparison,  Mccallum's  (1-988)  estlnation  resul-ts  for  the
are :
+  0.262 AYt_1  +  0.488 ABt
(.079)  (  .120)
i2:  o.z: s.  E. -  0.010
5.  T'he slmulation  procedure  used  below  employs  estlmates  of  lnflation  together
with  nornlnal  cNP  gror.tth  to  get  output  grosth,  a  component  in  Meltzer's  Rule  as
glven  by  equation  (1),  As  an  alternatlve,  Ite  also  approached  the  simulation  by
estinating  both  an  inflation  equatlon  and  an  output  equatlon'  using  the  sum of
the  two  predlcted  values  to  get  an  estlnate  for  nonlnal  GNP growth,  whlch  then
sould  be  used  to  generate  a  base  welocity  measure.  The  results  dlscussed  below
are  little  changed  when this  alternative  approach  ls  used.  These  results  are
L7avallable  upon request.
7,  We generate  a  seriea  of  shocks  during  the  slnulation  Perlod  uslng  equatlon
(3).  The  procedure  works  as  fol-lows  for  the  Hccallum  Rule:  After  estlnatlng
the  CNP  growth  €quatlon  using  1955-69  data,  a  serles  of  one-steP  ahead forecasts
are  generated  using  the  actual  values  for  both  lagged  nonetary  base  grol'th  and
GNP gro\tth.  Consequently,  the  forecast  errors  represent  the  Portlon  of  GNP
growth  not  sccounted  for  by  equatlon  (3)  and  are  deflned  as  shocks.  The
"observed"  shocks  are  then  added  back  lnto  equetLon  (3)  ln  the  sinulatlon  of
1970-89.
In  the  Meltzer  framework,  the  inflation  equatlon  ls  estlmated  using  the
1955-69  data.  To  obtain  the  sinulated  value  of  infletlon  we plug  the  sloulated
walues  of  lagged  lnflati.on  and  lagged  monetarJ  base  groltth.  The sinulated  value
of  GNP gro\tth  ls  constructed  exaetly  the  same way  as  in  the  McCallun  framework.
To  obtain  slnulated  walues  of  output  growth,  we  sinply  subtract  slnulated
inflation  frorn  sfunulated  GNP gro\tth.  Note  that  shocks  are  lncluded  in  the
construction  of  GNP growth,  buc  not  ln  the  constructlon  of  the  lnflation
equation.  Impllcltty  we  are  assuuing  that  shocks  to  GNP gro\rth  are  all  due  to
shocks  to  real  output  growth,  a view  not  unlike  that  taken  ln  llccallun's  tests.
8.  Loef  (1989)  also  questions  the  use  of  a  level  crlterion.  He  provldes
evldence  that  the  volatlllty  of  nomlnal  CNP growth  generated  using  Mc0allus's
Rule  is  not  less  than  the  actual  volatility  of  nomlnal  GNP growth  observed  for
the  Unlted  States  between  1955 and  l-985.
9.  If  as  Nelson  and  Plosser  (1982)  argue  noulnal  GNP ls  difference  stationary,
lhen  shocks  to  the  level  are  pernanent.  Forcing  GNP to  revert  back  to  a  trend
lewe1  rnakes little  sense  in  a  difference  stationary  settlng.
10.  This  is  a  small  sample  property,  Any  tr  >  0  w111  glve  rlse  Lo  errors
revertlng  back  toward  zero  over  tine.  Mccalltrn  has  noted,  however,  that  some
dynamic  lnstability  uay  atise  as  the  value  of  I  rlses  close  to  unity.  Artuably,
L8McCallum's  Rule  should  be nodified  in  a  growth  rate  context  so  that  the  feedback
tefin  responds  to  devtations  from  the  deslred  growth  rate.  I{e  trled  this
nodificatlon  wlthout  substantially  affectlng  the  results  rePorted  ln  Table  3'
11.  Why should  a  rule  that  sets  t  equal  to  zeto  yteld  the  suPerior  Perfornance?
The answer  lies  in  the  fact  that  base  veloclty  groltth  durlng  the  sanPle  Perlod
fluctuates  around  a  mean value  of  about  5  percent  for  the  sauPle  Perlod.  In  a
sinple  quantlty  theory  franework,  thls  would  nean  that  GNP  growth  would  be
sinulated  to  be,  on everage,  about  5  percent  above base  growth.  But,  slnce  che
slmulated  base  growth  is  detefinlned  by  equatlon  (2),  base  growth  is  adlusted  for
changes  in  its  veloclty  over  the  prevlous  four  years.  Ttlls  adjustnent  allorts
simulated  base  growth  to  adjust  for  the  changes  ln  veloclty  growth.  Notc  that
even  though  the  chariacteristic  of  base  weloclty  grorth  changes  followlng  1980,
the  constructlon  of  the  l{eltzer  and McCallum Rules  specl.ficall-y  allows  for  such
a  cnange.
12.  Alan  Greenspan,  Chairnan  of  the  Board  of  Govetnors  of  the  Federal  Reaerve
Systen,  noted  ln  testlnony  before  the  House  SubcomLttee  on  Domestlc  Monetary
PoLicy,  February  22,  L989,  that  ".  the  reason  we
the  monetary  base  is  that  a  very  substantial  parE,
U.S.  currency  is  outslde  Ehe  United  States  and
characteristics  ,  therefore,  to  affect  the  speciflc
bawe a problen  ln  utillzing
perhaps  rnore  than  half,  of
does  noc  have  any  of  the
actlvLty  wlthin  the  Unlted
States.  I,Ie tn  recent  months  have  examlned  the  nonetary  base  very  extenslvely
for  purposes  of  trylng  to  see how it  telates  to  inflatlon,  holt  lt  relates  to  the
economy,  and  have  found  that  it  is  not  a  useful  tool  for  us  [pollcy  nakersl.n
For  a  somewhat different  conclusion,  see Haslag  and Hein  (1989).
13.  Because the  monetary  base  is  the  sunnatlon  of  currency  and  total  reserves,
we  can  calculate  the  proportion  of  the  vatlance  of  base  growth  due  to  the
variances  of  currency  and teserve  growth.  Calculatlon  of  the  relattve  variances
19ltrat  is,  currency  growth  is  calculated  as  (Cc  -
cti/l  (Bt + Bt-1)/21. For  the  full-perlod,  the  varlance
accounts  for  about  50  percent  of  the  varlance  in  uoneCary
lmportant  to  note  that  this  percentage  varles  wldely  over
the  wariance  ln  currency  growth  explalns  about  60  percent
base  growth  ln  the  1960s,  about  75  percent  for  the  1970s
during  the  1980s.
of  currency  growth
base  growth.  It  1s
time.  For  exaraple,
of  the  varlance  ln
and  on1,y  22  percent
is  properly  done by  neasurlng
changes  relative  to  the  base.
the  growth  of  currency  and  reserves  as  percentage
14.  Cagan (1982)  argues  that  "The  advanee  informatlon  provtded  by  the  base  ls
questionable  because  of  its  urajor  conponent,  currency,  "(p.  576)  Cagan bases
this  stetement  on  the  flndlng  that  when  he  regresses  nomlnal  GNP growth  on
contemporaneous  and  lagged  values  of  checkable  deposlts  and  currency,  "The
currency  contrlbution  is  significant  when  the  concurrent  values  of  the  two
conponents  are  lncluded  but  quite  lnsignificant  when they  are  excluded.  Ttlls  ls
consistent  with  the  flndlngs  of  a  strong  feedback  from  GNP  to  currency,  "(p.  673)
B.  Frlednan  (1988)  also  notes  that  nthe  Federal  Reserve  Systen  has  never
ptetended  to  linlt  the  anount  of  currency  in  cLfculation,  but  lnstead  has
explicitly  acted  to  acconrnodate  fluctuatlons  in  the  publl-c's  demand  for
currency."(p.206)
15.  The forn  of  our  equation  is  sirnilar  to  that  used  ln  Cagan (1982)  and Pierce
(L977).
L6.  Given  the  small  estimate  of  the  Lnterest  elastlcity,  onltting  the  interest
fate  ln  the  currency  equation  does  not  qualltatively  alter  the  results
Dresented.
I7.  I,Ie also  experinented  with  slnulating  total  reserves  and  deriving  currency
as  the  residual  component.  Uslng  a  simulation  equation  that  relates  total
reserve  growth  to  current  GNP along  with  lagged  values  of  GNP grorrth  and  total
reserves,  the  slnulated  currency  values  turn  negatlve  by  the  end  of  the  sanple
20perlod.
18,  lJe also  attenpted  to  determine  what  interest  rate  behavlor  would  be  like
under  a  base  rule  teglne,  For  heurlstlc  purposes  we  assune  Ehat  our  goal  ls
to j ust keep  total  reserves  at  the  lewel  observed  in  1970.1.  Bsck-of-the-
envelope  calculations  lndlcate  that  under  the  thxee  percent  Srovth  rate  rule,
the  three-nonth  Treasury  bill  rate  nould  have  to
1989.4  to  malntain  the  level  of  total  reserves.
the  stmuLsted  lnterest  rate  increases  to  about  750
rlse  to  over  300  percent  by
Ior  a base  rule  of  I  -  0.50,
percent.
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23Table  1
Suonary  Statlstics  for  Stnulatlon
Sarnple Perlodi  I97O  -  L989
Rule  ru'fsEl
l,leltzer  Rule  0. 1"239
Errors:  L€vels
uE2
o  .027  6
l,lccallum Rule:














-  0  .0010




1.  Rl,lSE  represents  the  root-means  squared  error'
n^
RMSE  -  tI  r  (xi-xt*)zl/nlLtz
I
where  X  ls  sirnulated  GNP and  X*  is  the  target  value'
2.  ME reptesencs  the  Eean error,  defLned  as
n
ME  -  [E(xi -x1*  )  ],/n
i
deflned  asTable  2
Test  Statistlcs  for  Unit  Roots  ln




McCallun  Rule :




X-Percent Rule  :


















1.  Estimated  equations  include  constant  terxn
variable  .
2.  Crltlcal  value  at  5 percent  lewe1  is  about
(*)  denotes  signiflcance  st  5 percent  lewel.
and  lagged  value  of
-7,89.  See Fuller
dependent
(1979).  AnTab1e 3
Sunnary  Statistlcs  for










X-Percent Rule  :
B -  0.01
B -  3.01
EUS.E
0  .  01rs
0  .  0101













See footnotes  to  Table  1-Table  4
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